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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Book Reviews
FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, by Jacques Rueif. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929. Pp. xxxiv, 159.
In a prefatory note to the volume here reviewed, reference is made to the
"effort now being made in many quarters to borrow from the physical
sciences their more exact, objective, and fruitful methods for use in the
social sciences. This latter is a movement so far-reaching that it may
very well come to characterize the history of thought in the period just
ahead of us." If the prophecy made is to come true, a technique for ap-
plying these more "exact, objective and fruitful" methods must be devised.
It is fair to assume that this volume purports to suggest the way to such
a technique.
Of the result, the least that may be said is that it is enormously interest-
ing and stimulating. The legal reader may find the introduction more so
than the matter it introduces. The text proper, by M. Rueff, consists of
an acute analysis of the thinking process or the scientific method-perhaps
the two are synonymous-with an application thereof to various physical
and social sciences. No one interested in the process of thinking on any
subject will fail to find new light here. The style is a model of compact-
ness. Ideas are stripped bare and set forth simply, yet clearly. Indeed,
the skill with which M. Rueff has made subtle and elusive things appear
obvious is sometimes misleading.
Is there here, however, any definite contribution towards the solution of
legal problems? That is necessarily a question which each individual read-
er must answer for himself. Many will think not, and the reviewer is in-
clined to agree. For a more specific application reference must be made
to the introduction, by Messrs. Oliphant and Hewitt. Here is set forth at
some length an attitude at present rather widely current in some quarters
towards conventional legal methods. "So far as most lawyers, judges and
legal scholars are conscious of methods employed in their work, they avow
three types of approach to the legal problems with which they deal. For
convenience let them here be called the transcendental, the inductive and the
practical methods respectively." The naming of these types alone would
justify the book. Each is explained and criticized. The criticism is severe,
yet the justice of much of it cannot be gainsaid, nor can the need for it be
doubted. The tendency of lawyers to cling to traditional methods is noto-
rious, yet in no field of learning should traditions be more carefully
scrutinized. Here they are brought out into the searching and, on the
whole, unbecoming, light of publicity. To whatever extent the individual
reader may feel all the criticisms justified or the contrary, he can hardly
fail to be led to a tonic reconsideration of his own method of approach in
the light of these criticisms.
The reviewer confesses frankly that a few of the criticisms seem to him
excessive or ill-taken. He would not, for example, admit that principles,
i. e., generalizations based upon experience, are to be wholly disregarded
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in judicial decision, nor that the general validity of a particular principle
may be destroyed by showing it, in a given case, to conflict with another
principle of general validity. Again, he would not admit that common
sense is to be discredited as a criterion simply by showing that it often is
not used "methodically." This is to criticize not common sense but human
fallibility. Most of all he regrets the lack of any specific setting forth of
a new and better approach. Considering the purpose of the introduction,
the lack seems more glaring here than in the text proper. Messrs. Oli-
phant and Hewitt pose a hypothetical case, state and repudiate accepted
methods of solving it-and practically leave the matter there. Destructive-
ly, they are specific; constructively, they deal in generalizations. Certainly,
to this extent, their work is disappointing.
Granting that there is fundamentally only one process of handling a
scientific problem, be it mechanical, psychological or social, can the ma-
terials of the so-called social sciences ever be as "exact" or as "objective"
as those of the physical sciences? (Surely no technique can be more exact
or objective than the materials with which it must deal.) This seems to
the reviewer the ultimate question. It has been well, even brilliantly,
raised in this volume; and a question once raised is at least half answered.
PHILIP MECHEM.
Washington University School of Law.
THE CASE OF THOMAS J. MOONEY AND WARREN K. BILLINGS, (Abstract and
Analysis of Record before Governor Young, of California), by Henry T.
Hunt. New York: National Mooney-Billings Committee, 1929. Pp. 445.
Another Christmas has come and gone, and still Mooney and Billings rot
in California penitentiaries. Of their innocence of the crime for which
they were convicted and sentenced there is not the slightest doubt. That
they were railroaded into prison by means of perjured testimony has been
conclusively demonstrated. Every important official connected with the
trial of Mooney, except the prosecuting attorney and one of the ten living
jurors has urged that the injustice which was done to the defendant be reme-
died so far as that is possible. The trial judge in particular has been un-
ceasing in his efforts to undo the wrong in which he was an unwitting
participant. Several sets of impartial investigators, including one especial-
ly appointed for that purpose by President Wilson, have concluded that
the verdicts against the two men should not stand. Yet three successive
governors of California, in the face of the evidence and these opinions,
have refused to act in order to vindicate the fairness of the government of
California. Governor Stephens, who was in office at the time the men
were sentenced, commuted Mooney's original death sentence to life im-
prisonment upon the urging of President Wilson, but there the matter has
rested ever since. Governor Young, the present incumbent, after himself
examining a large part of the record in the Mooney case, has referred the
matter to a special advisory commission which, no doubt, will sooner or
later rcnder its report.
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